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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE UNDER
INDIANA'S "COMMON SCHEME OR
PLAN" EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
In Indiana, as elsewhere,I it is generally improper in a criminal trial to
introduce into evidence uncharged criminal acts of the defendant in order to
show his likely guilt of the crime charged. 2 To this general rule, Indiana
courts have created a host of exceptions,3 one of the most frequently used be-
ing invoked where the evidence of other criminal activity concerns the defen-
dant's "intent, motive, purpose, identification or a common scheme or
plan."'4 This "common scheme or plan" exception, expressly recognized in In-
diana since 1921, 5 has grown to such an extent as to obfuscate the general
rule of exclusion of other-crimes evidence.
The fundamental problem with admitting such evidence is balancing its
potential for harm6 against its probative value; this is compounded in Indiana
by the confusion of three separate exceptions to the general exclusionary rule.
This confusion is attributable to the broad statement of the exception in an
early Indiana Supreme Court case, 7 which has allowed later courts much
'See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 188 (Cleary ed. 1972).
2E.g., Pierce v. State, - Ind. - , 369 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1977).
'Exceptions have been found where the evidence shows the res gestae of the charged
crime, Land v. State, - Ind. App. - , 367 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1977); the defendant's guilty
knowledge, Samuels v. State, 159 Ind. App. 657, 660-61, 308 N.E.2d 879, 881 (1974); the volun-
tariness of the act, Schnee v. State, 254 Ind. 661, 663, 262 N.E.2d 186, 188 (1970); the malice
with which the act was done, Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 104, 95 N.E.2d 570, 580 (1950);
defendant's attempt to conceal the crime, Bell v. State, - Ind. App. - , 319 N.E.2d 859,
862 (1974); the defendant's insanity, Baker v. State, 190 Ind. 385, 129 N.E. 468 (1921); how
defendant came into possession of the instruments of the crime, Maldonado v. State, - Ind.
- , 355 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1976); the plausibility of the story of the charged crime, Borolos v.
State, 194 Ind. 469, 478, 143 N.E. 360, 363 (1924); and in sex crimes, although this exception is
not settled in the courts: dictum in Cobbs v. State, - Ind. - , 338 N.E.2d 632, 633 (1975)
seems to limit the evidence to those cases where depraved sexual instinct, specifically incest or
sodomy, is at issue, although Lawrence v. State, 259 Ind. 306, 310, 286 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1972)
found the exception applicable in sex crime cases generally, apparently broadening the rule
stated in Woods v. State, 250 Ind. 132. 148, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 (1968), which admits such
evidence in prosecutions for crimes involving a depraved sexual instinct or to prove intent in cases
of assault with intent to commit rape. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed.
1972).
4E.g., Pierce v. State, - Ind. - , 369 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1977).
'Zimmerman v. State, 190 Ind. 537, 130 N.E. 235 (1921).
'The risks of admission have been summarized as: 1) excessive consumption of time, 2) un-
necessary confusion of the issues to be determined, 3) excitation of the jury's emotions to the un-
due prejudice of the defendant, 4) unfair surprise to the defendant, and 5) unnecessary embar-
rassment of court personnel, defendant, or the public. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevan-
cy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 392 (1952). See also Stone, The Rule of Exclu-
sion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 957-58 (1933).
7See note 33, infra.
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room for creative interpretation. The courts have taken advantage of this op-
portunity by developing at least three types of common scheme, which have
in turn contributed to the growing confusion surrounding the exception and
the improper admission of other-crimes evidence.
This note takes the position that the "common scheme or plan" excep-
tion, properly applied, is sound and should be retained. However, the excep-
tion should be reexamined as to its purpose and application, distinguished
from other, conceptually distinct exceptions, and utilized in a manner which
protects the interests of accused persons while. allowing the state to prove its
case with reliable and probative evidence.
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF EXCLUSION
The issue underlying the admission of evidence of other crimes is whether
its probative value outweighs its potential for harm.8 Although Professor
Trautman advocates a two-part balancing test to resolve the question,9 the
trial court's immediate need to decide to admit or exclude such evidence
makes the test he proposes unworkable as a practical matter. 10 The statement
by the Indiana Supreme Court that "[t]he admissibility of the evidence
relating to other offenses presents a question for the sound discretion of the
trial court, guided only by very general standards or tests,"" provides a more
workable solution, but, except for one case, 12 the court has offered few, if
any, general standards or tests to guide trial courts.
The difficulty created by the need to balance the benefits against the
risks of admission is aggravated in Indiana by the confusion of three different
exceptions: the "depraved sexual instinct" exception,13 the "modus operandi"
exception,14 and the true "common scheme or plan" exception.' s The confu-
sion of the "common scheme or plan" and the "modus operandi" exceptions
with the "depraved sexual instinct" exception 6 is an obvious error of law, and
8See note 6, supra.
9Professor Trautman would have the trial court: 1) determine the logical relevancy (a
determination it should make in any offering of evidence), and then 2) balance its probathe
value against the policy risks, supra note 6, at 393.
"
0The court would have to check the five-point list, supra note 6, totalling the risks it
perceives, and then balance this total against its perception of the total probative value of the
evidence. Compounding the problem would be the futility in many cases of predicting time con
sumption and of intuiting the confusion of issues, the undue prejudice, and the potential for em
barrassment which could result from admitting the evidence.
"Gears v. State, 203 Ind. 380, 385, 180 N.E. 585, 587 (1932).
"
5 Loveless v. State, 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864 (1960).
"See note 3, supra.
'
4The purpose of such evidence is "[t]o prove other like crimes by the accused so identical
in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused." (footnote omitted) C. MCCOR
MICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 449 (Cleary ed. 1972).
5 Evidence falling under this exception is admitted "[t]o prove the existence of a larger con-
tinuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the present crime on trial is a part." (footnote
omitted). Id.
'
6E.g., in Pierce v. State, - Ind. - , 369 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1977), a prosecution for
kidnapping and commission of a felony while armed, the court said, "All parties agree that the
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can be eliminated by more careful application of these exceptions. The
distinction between the "common scheme or plan" exception and the "modus
operandi" exception is, however, somewhat more elusive in both its ascertain-
ment and effect, and should be squarely confronted and resolved by the
court.
The common scheme or plan exception has been recognized in the last
half-century by courts, commentators and text writers.' 7 Dean McCormick
states the purpose of evidence admitted under the exception to be
[tlo prove the existence of a larger, continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy,
of which the present crime on trial is a part. This will be relevant as showing
motive, and hence the doing of the criminal act, the identity of the actor,
and his intention, where any of these is in dispute."8
Dean Wigmore would apply the exception when the evidence tends to show
"a definite prior design or system which included the doing of the act charg-
ed as a part of its consummation. ""t According to Wigmore, "the result is to
show (by probability) a precedent design which in its turn is to evidence (by
probability) the doing of the act designed. " 20
This situation, in which the defendant formulated a plan including two
or more criminal acts, is conceptually distinguishable from the modus
operandi situation, in which the evidence proves "other like crimes by the ac-
cused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of
the accused."12' That is to say, there is a difference between two or more crimes
being part of a larger scheme or plan (the classic common scheme or plan ex-
ception) on the one hand, and a scheme or plan common to two or more
crimes (the classic modus operandi exception) on the other. Although, as Mc-
Cormick says, "the purposes [of the exceptions] are not mutually exclusive, for
a particular line of proof may fall within several of them," 22 the criteria for
recognizing the applicability of the exceptions, particularly the common
leading case on this issue is Woods v. State (1968) 250 Ind. 132, 143, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486 .... The
holding in Woods, a rape-incest case, can be found three paragraphs below that cited by the
Pierce court: "But the testimony of the prosecuting witness ... falls squarely within the exception
to the general rule as to the admissibility of prior criminal acts in cases involving a 'depraved sex-
ual instinct."' 250 Ind. at 144, 235 N.E.2d at 486. It is unsettling to note that both court and
counsel in Pierce overlooked this express distinction.
"E.g., 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300, 304 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §
190 (Cleary ed. 1972); Note Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Crime: Instructions
toJury, 35 CAL. L. REv. 131, 136-37 (1947).
"C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).
"02 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d ed. 1940).
20ld.
21C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972) (footnote omitted). For a more explicit
treatment of this distinction, see Note, Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Crime:
Instructions to Jury, 35 CAL. L. REv. 131, 136-37 (1947) (McCormick cites this note as "Note, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1935)," id. at n.36).
21C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972).
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scheme or plan and modus operandi, are different and should be kept
distinct.
The failure on the part of the commentators to distinguish these criteria
is demonstrated by the cases collected by McCormick to illustrate the com-
mon scheme or plan exception, 23 as well as in Wigmore's requirement that
-there "must be, not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence
of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as
caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations. "2 4
One of the results of this confusion in Indiana is the courts' requirement
of a showing of similarity between the crime charged and the crime used in
evidence. 25 Where the charged crime and the evidentiary crime are parts of a
common scheme or plan they might or might not be similar. For example,
where defendant is charged with assault and battery on a guard and theft of
his uniform, it is obviously probative that he also stole a gun, hijacked an ar-
mored car and, posing as the driver of the vehicle, induced a company to
transfer to the car its weekly receipts. None of these acts are similar, but they
show the motive and intent behind the assault and thus tend to identify the
actor. That the criminal acts have occurred over an extended period of time
and in places distant from each other does not decrease the relevance of the
evidence, since criminal plans often include acts which occur in widely
separate places and over a span of many months or years.
On the other hand, where defendant has, through a fraudulent scheme,
induced another to part with his money, and later uses the same scheme on
another person, it can scarcely be said that the first act was part of a plan of
which the other was also a part. In that case, the scheme had not been for-
mulated at the time of the first act; the modus operandi is the link connec-
ting the two, and the primary inference from the two crimes considered
together is not motive, but identity, guilty knowledge, or the absence of
mistake. Thus when defendant, on trial for either act, alleges that he did not
commit the crime, evidence that he committed the other in the same way is
strongly probative that he did commit the crime charged. In this case, unlike
the common scheme or plan situation, the value of the evidence will increase
with the singularity of the modus operandi, and decrease with the dissimilari-
ty of the various acts and their lack of physical or temporal proximity. 26 For
21Id. at n.35. Makin v. Attorney Gen. of New S. Wales, [1894] A.C. 57 (1893) is
distinguishable, as a modus operandi exception, from the other cases cited, all of which are
clearly "common scheme or plan" cases.
24J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore is not clear about what he means
by "a similarity in the results," but if that phrase, and the phrase "a concurrence of common
features," are together construed to mean similarity in the modus operandi, as was apparently in-
tended, then the confusion under discussion has infected his work also.
25See, e.g., Maldonado v. State, - Ind. - , 355 N.E.2d 843, 847 (1976): "[T]his
evidence shows a common scheme or plan relevant to appellant's guilt .... The robbery sought
to be committed in Michigan City resembled the one executed in Evansville in numerous details."
26Although the relative weight of proximity becomes less important as the singularity of the
modus operandi increases.
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this reason, the courts, in balancing the value of the modus operandi
evidence against its potential for harm, 27 have typically required a very high
degree of similarity. 2
8
INDIANA CASE LAW
The incorporation of the common scheme or plan exception into Indiana
law is built upon, and in some ways parallels, the recognition of the ad-
missibility of other-crimes evidence generally. 29 The exception made its In-
diana debut in a case"0 which cited a New York Court of Appeals decisions'
2'See note 6, supra.
"
8See C, McCORMIcK. EVIDENCE § 190, at n.37 (Cleary ed. 1972); Biggerstaff v. State,
-Ind. -, 361 N.E.2d 895, 897 (1977). Of course, temporal or physical proximity, when great
enough, brings the evidence under the res gestae exception, supra note 3.
21The Indiana Supreme Court, in McCartney v. State, 3 Ind. 353 (1852), recognized that
uncharged crimes can and should be used in evidence in some cases. The court cited United States v.
Roudenbush, 27 F. Cas. 902, 903 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1932) where, in a lengthy discussion of the mat-
ter, the federal court said,
To justify the admission of such evidence of a distinct passing, the notes must be of the
same or similar manufacture and appearance (Car. Cr. Law, 195) calculated to lead
to the belief that they were of the same character. A man who passes one counterfeit
at one time, and a similar one at another, may well be presumed to have known them
both to be so; but not when the notes are on different banks, or so unlike in ap-
pearance, that an honest man might think one good, though the other was known to
be bad. . . . [T]his is an exception from the ordinary rules of evidence in criminal
cases, unfavourable to the accused . . ."
The McCartney court's statement of the exception, however, did not deal with the reasoning
underlying the exception; it simply held that, "the uttering of other counterfeit notes of the same
kind with that charged in the indictment, and about the time that it was passed, may be given in
evidence . . . to prove guilty knowledge." 3 Ind. at 354. (Contra Loveless v. State, 240 Ind. 534,
539, 166 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1960): "[O]ne crime cannot be proved in order to establish another
distinct crime even though they be of the same kind.") This bare-bones statement of the modus
operandi exception in McCartney is correct, but provides the trial court with little guidance (for
example, as to the meaning of "kind"), as compared with the more thoroughly explanatory
discussion in Roudenbush.
One effect of this corner-cutting statement of the modus operandi exception was the result in
Beuchert v. State, 165 Ind. 523, 76 N.E. 111 (1905), a prosecution for receiving stolen goods,
namely iron or steel bars stolen from a forge company. The court allowed evidence that watches
and jewelry had previously been found in defendant's safe, and the testimony of three witnesses
that these items had been stolen from them. The court held:
[I]n trials for receiving stolen goods evidence tending to prove that other stolen goods
were found in the possession of the defendant at the time, or prior to the receiving
complained of, is competent to be considered with all the other evidence in the case on
the question of guilty knowledge. . . . Guilty knowledge may be proved by direct
evidence, or by any surrounding facts by which it may be inferred.
165 Ind. at 527-28, 76 N.E. at 113. This holding, although not in exactly the same language as
that in McCartney, is arguably within its meaning; but the conflict with Roudenbush, upon
which McCartney relied, is apparent. The result is confusion over the degree of similarity re-
quired to be shown between the evidence purportedly demonstrating defendant's guilty
knowledge in the "other" crime, and the evidence relating to the charged crime.
Another parallel between Indiana's'incorporation of the common scheme or plan exception
and the general development of the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is discussed at note 35,
infra.
0Zimmerman v. State, 190 Ind. 537, 130 N.E. 235 (1921).
31People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
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wherein the exception was discussed at length. The Indiana Supreme Court
did not elucidate on the reasoning underlying the exception, 32 giving instead
a summary3s of the New York court's recapitulation that, "[g]enerally speak-
ing, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged
when it tends to establish . .. a common scheme or plan embracing the com-
mission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of orie tends
to establish the others.
34
The general history of the admission of other-crimes evidence shows that
the result of the simplistic formulation given in Indiana decisions is uncer-
tainty as to the standards for admission of the evidence. 35 Likewise, the shift-
2E.g., quoting from H. UNDERHILL. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 88 (2d ed. 1910), the New York
court said:
'[T]he two must be connected as parts of a general and complete scheme or plan ....
Hence on a trial for homicide it is permissible to prove that the accused killed another
person during the time he was preparing for or was in the act of committing the
homicide for which he is on trial. . . . Some connection between the crimes must be
shown to have existed in fact and in the mind of the actor, uniting them for the ac-
complishment of a common purpose, before such evidence can be received. This con-
nection must clearly appear from the evidence. . . . If the court does not clearly
perceive it, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence re-
jected. ... .' The compendium just quoted . . . is so accurate and concise that no other
text writers will be cited, although there are many of them. There is, indeed, no room
for discussion in regard to the general principles. . . .
168 N.Y. at 305-06, 61 N.E. at 299.
33[W]hen the act constituting the crime has been established, then any evidence ten-
ding to show motive, intent, or guilty knowledge, if in issue, or evidence which directly
or as a natural sequence tends to show the defendant guilty of the crime charged, is
competent, although it also tends to show him guilty of another and distinct offense.
Zimmerman v. State, 190 Ind. 537, 542, 130 N.E. 235, 237 (1921) (emphasis added). This state-
ment, in allowing any evidence, does not look to any of the five dangers cited in note 6 supra nor
does it hang upon the evidence any threshold requirements of reliability, such as a showing of a
larger plan, focusing instead solely upon whether the evidence tends to show a motive. (The
vague phrase requiring a direct or naturally following showing of defendant's guilt is used in the
disjunctive, and expands, rather than restricts, the amount of evidence admissible at trial.)
34People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (1901).
"
5Most notable in this regard is the question whether, where the offered other-crimes
evidence is probative of defendant's knowledge, intent and the like, his charged acts must be
equivocal as to that state of mind. That is, where the acts could only have been performed with
guilty knowledge, such as solicitation of a bribe, Indiana courts have been inconsistent in ruling
on admissibility of evidence of other, similar acts. See, e.g., Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208, 214-15
(1882) (obtaining money by false pretenses; held, where charged crime "carries with it the evi-
dent implication of a criminal intent," other-crimes evidence inadmissible); Crum v. State, 148
Ind. 401, 412-13, 47 N.E. 833, 837 (1897) (grand larceny; expressly overruling Strong: un-
necessarily broad holding, as it is competent, in a larceny prosecution, to show the defendant's
intention to convert the proceeds to his own use. Axtell v. State, 173 Ind. 711, 713, 91 N.E. 354,
355 (1910).); Kahn v. State, 182 Ind. 1, 3-4, 105 N.E. 385, 386 (1914) (arson; other-crimes
evidence inadmissible where charged act unequivocal); Vandeveer v. State, 256 Ind. 509. 511,
269 N.E.2d 865, 866 (1971) (bribery; although other-crimes " 'evidence is admissible only where
. . .motive, malice intent or guilty knowledge . . . is an issue,' "evidence of earlier solicitations
"tends to show both intent and guilty knowledge."); Duvose v. State, 257 Ind. 450, 452, 275
N.E.2d 536, 537 (1971) (rape and kidnapping; evidence of rapes in Pennsylvania inadmissible as
not relevant "to any point in issue to the case . .. .); Stone v. State, 258 Ind. 281, 281 N.E.2d
799 (1972) (forgery; evidence of uttering four other forged checks, payable to defendant, admissi-
ble (although not particularly probative as to identity, since three of those receiving them could
[Vol. 53:805
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ing, vague use of the common scheme or plan exception specifically
threatens to create an "anything goes" policy in those cases where even the
most tenuous relationship can be found, or manufactured, between or among
the crimes.
At present, common scheme or plan crimes in Indiana fall into at least
three categories: 1) The charged crime and the "other crime" are both parts
of a prior plan which includes them both. This is the true exception, and
shows the motive behind the charged crime, although identity, mens rea, and
other elements may be inferred. 2) The modus operandi of the "other crime"
is the same as that of the charged crime. When correctly applied, this modus
operandi exception tends to prove, for example, the identity, intent, or,
guilty knowledge of the actor, and therefore requires a high degree of
similarity between the crimes. 3) The "other crime" is of the same general
type as the charged crime, and was committed in the same general area. The
courts hold that this shows a common scheme or plan to commit that type of
crime against a class.36
The result of the muddling of the first two subdivisions is misapplication
of both exceptions, so that neither accomplishes the purpose for which it was
created. The third category is more threatening because its potential for
misuse by courts and prosecutors is great, and it is at odds with several basic
values and policies of our legal system.3 7
An early example of the use of the modus operandi exception under the
name of the common scheme of plan exception is Gears v. State,38 a pro-
secution for grand larceny.3 9 Gears was charged with the theft of fifty
chickens; at the site of the theft were found unusual footprints and
automobile tire tread marks, which were also discovered at the scenes of a
not identify him as the utterer while the cashier in the act charged, who had known him since his
childhood, could; nor particularly probative as to guilty knowledge, since that could be inferred
from the fact that check was payable to defendant and drawn on account of stone company
defunct for more than a decade)); Lawrence v. State, 259 Ind. 306, 310, 286 N.E.2d 830, 832-33
(1972) (admissible if "relevant to some issue in the case"); Trinkle v. State, 153 Ind. App. 524,
530, 288 N.E.2d 165, 169 (1972) ("evidence of prior offenses which tends to show a common
scheme or plan is properly admissible."). Perhaps the courts' inconsistency over whether other-
crimes evidence will be admitted even when the act precludes an innocent intent can be at least
partially attributed to the West Reporter System's headnotes, which have passed over this ap-
parently subtle point. See, e.g., Kahn v. State, 105 N.E. 385 (1914) (headnote 1); Carpenter v.
State, 131 N.E. 375 (1921) (headnote 1). Judges and attorneys under time strictures may well lose
this distinction, also. See also note 29, supra.
S6E.g., Kindred v. State, 254 Ind. 127, 258 N.E.2d 411 (1970).
31See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1948):
Of what avail would be the rule that the character of a defendant on trial may not be
attacked unless he puts it in issue, or that an accused's denial on cross examination of
criminal conduct inquired about for purpose of impeachment may not be contradicted
except by the record of conviction, if it were permissible to introduce parol evidence of
other crimes merely for the purpose of showing the accused to be a man of bad
character likely to commit the crime charged?
31203 Ind. 380, 180 N.E. 585 (1932).
"Gears was also instrumental in the creation of the third category. See text at note 55 in-
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later chicken theft and a subsequent attempted chicken theft. Gears was con-
nected with the attempt by other evidence, and the second and third crimes
were used as evidence of his involvement in the first. The court, ruling on the
admissibility of the evidence of the later theft and attempt, held that it
"substantially tended to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
charged, and also to show a scheme or plan to commit a series of acts of
larceny which included the crime charged. "4 0 That the evidence was compe-
tent and should have been admitted is clear, as it identified the actor through
the distinctive association of his peculiar footprint with the unusual tire tread
marks. It is equally clear, though, that the evidence showed, not a plan to
commit a series of acts of larceny, but the mere fact that Gears had commit-
ted a series of acts of larceny. The results of the case are correct, but the
court's confusion of modus operandi with common scheme or plan is evident.
Seven years later in Hergenrother v. State,41 an armed robbery case, the
court properly refused to admit evidence which seemingly should have been
admitted under the Gears interpretation of the common scheme or plan ex-
ception. An alleged accomplice had been permitted to testify that, within the
three days prior to the commission of the charged offense, he and the defen-
dant had robbed or tried to rob three persons. After quoting Gears extensive-
ly, the court held the evidence inadmissible and clearly interpreted Gears as
an example of the modus operandi exception, 42 spurning the chance to find,
in the method of the Gears court, a "plan to commit a series of acts."4 3
Hergenrother thus tried to limit Gears' expansive interpretation of the legal
meaning of a common scheme or plan.
Concurrent with the development of the plan-to-commit-a-series-of-
crimes criterion for admission of other-crimes evidence was the evolution of
another criterion, which relied upon the commission of crimes against a class
of which the victim was a member. This standard originated in Peats v.
State,44 in which appellant, a member of the Teamsters Union, had been
convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of a nonunion truck driver, and in
which the evidence showed a prior plan to attack nonunion truck drivers in
"Gears v. State, 203 Ind. 380, 386, 180 N.E. 585, 587 (1932).
41215 Ind. 89, 18 N.E.2d 784 (1939).
41
[T]he evidence . . . failed to show any similarity in the method used that would in any
way tend to prove that the person who committed those crimes was the same person
who committed the robbery laid in the affidavit .... We can not see any relevancy, or
probative force whatever in the evidence, objected to. It did not tend to prove any
essential element of the crime charged, and could have but one purpose and effect,
and that was to prejudice the appellant in the minds of the jury.
Id. at 95-96, 18 N.E.2d at 787.
'
3 The court's analysis may have been aided a bit by other testimony: "Evans Peak, the at-
tendant of the filling station [and whom defendant was charged with robbing], testified that ap-
pellant was not the person who held him up and robbed him . . . but that [the alleged ac-
complice] was the person." Id. at 96, 18 N.E.2d at 788.
44213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E.2d 270 (1938).
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the area. The evidence was admitted as showing motive, malice and intent.45
This "scheme against a class" language was invoked again in Kallas v.
State,41 a first-degree murder case in which the defendant, a homosexual,
allegedly had invited the male decedent to his hotel room for drinks. The
state was allowed to present evidence of "various prior specific acts . . . of
perversion perpetrated by the appellant upon boys and young men other than
the decedent." 47 The court found that "this chain of events evidenced ap-
pellant's design, scheme, plan, system and intention to satisfy his grossly ab-
normal sexual impulses," 48 and that "[p]roof of his particular abnormal men-
tal condition was circumstantial evidence of his motive and intent in luring
the decedent to his room and then killing him." 49 The Kallas court, in
mistakenly relying upon the "plan against a class," rather than the essential
"prior plan," element of the Peats holding, created a new criterion for the
application of the common scheme or plan exception: "Where there is a com-
mon purpose and design by way of a conspiracy 0 to assault a class of persons,
other offenses are relevant and may be admitted in evidence."51
The next year, the court tied the ill-conceived scheme against a class
criterion to the incorrectly applied plan to commit a series of crimes
criterion, in Watts v. State.52 Watts was a prosecution for first-degree murder
and murder while attempting rape in which the court held admissible
evidence of prior rapes and rape attempts, and the testimony of a woman
who escaped Watts by running from her home after he had ordered her at
knifepoint to disrobe. The evidence was correctly ruled admissible because it
OThis approaches the sound application of the common scheme or plan exception. The
state shows the scheme's existence and other crimes committed in furtherance of that scheme,
and the jury then assesses the probability of the defendant's guilt. Its weakness is that, even given
this evidence, it is not unlikely that another has committed the charged crime. If the prior plan
could not have been executed without the charged crime, and if the plan had demonstrably been
executed, the common scheme or plan exception would have been available.
The evidentiary and charged crimes in this kind of case are likely to be very similar, but
similarity does not influence the admissibility of the evidence; rather, if the similarity is so great
as to lead to the conclusion that all of the acts must have been performed by the same actor, the
evidence could have been admitted under the modus operandi exception.
4227 Ind. 103, 83 N.E.2d 769 (1949), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 940 (1949).
47Id. at 113, 83 N.E.2d at 773.
4"Id.
0Id. at 122, 83 N.E.2d at 777. While his homosexuality may have shown a motive and in-
tent for "luring" his victim to his room, it is not clear how this evidences either a motive or intent
to kill.
50It is unclear why the court chose to include conspiracy language here, as there was no
conspiracy involved, and the language seems not to be required by an interpretation of Peats. In
fact, the court by the use of this word achieved the remarkable result of not only making bad
law, but misapplying it to the facts of the case at bar.
11227 Ind. at 113-14, 83 N.E.2d at 773. A major distinction between Peats and Kallas is
that in the former the inference is easily and readily drawn, whereas in the latter, a prosecution
for homicide, and inference of homicidal intent is at the least very difficult to draw from
evidence of homosexuality, or even evidence of "indecent assaults." See note 32, supra, and ac-
companying text.
11229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950).
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"tended to prove intent, malice, and identity." s However, the court incor-
rectly stated that the evidence "revealed a definite plan, system, and scheme
against a class of which the deceased was a member."5 4
Watts thus combined in one decision the worst features of two lines of
cases: from Gears it took the "plan to commit a series of acts of [a type of
crime]," 5 and from Kallas the "design . . . to [commit a crime upon] a class
of persons."5 6 This is unfortunate for two reasons: first, it was completely un-
necessary because the modus operandi exception could properly have been
relied upon to admit the evidence; and second, the court's vague reference to
a "plan, system, and scheme against a class"57 facilitates misuse of the excep-
tion. The problem with this scheme against a class formulation is that, if car-
ried to its logical extreme, a class could ultimately become "humanity. " 58
The subtle broadening of these spurious criteria was demonstrated in
Kindred v. State,5" a prosecution for forgery. Kindred had allegedly obtained
$50 from a bank by presenting to the teller another man's credit card and
forging his signature. Although the teller could not identify Kindred at trial,
531d. at 104, 95 N.E.2d at 580. This is, of course, the modus operandi exception, properly
exercised here because of the concurrence of several distinguishing features, such as the type of
truck driven by the actor and the area and time of day characterstic of the acts.
"
4Id. at 103, 95 N.E.2d at 579. There is no "plan, system and scheme" revealed here, in
the sense of the actor's having plotted his acts in advance, although the use of the word "system,"
isolated from "plan" and "scheme," is justified; but this then becomes the modus operandi excep-
tion, an interpretation inconsistent with the rest of the sentence.
55d.
"
6The Watts court also cited Borolos v. State, 194 Ind. 469, 143 N.E. 360 (1924), to sup-
port its "scheme against a class" standard. 229 Ind. at 103, 95 N.E.2d at 579. The Borolos
holding, however, was that
where the evidence discloses a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the
others, or offers and explanation of facts that, unexplained, would tend to discredit
the evidence introduced by the state, evidence of other crimes than the one charged in
the indictment is sometimes admissible; and this rule is particularly applicable to trials
for sexual offenses.
194 Ind. at 473, 143 N.E. at 361. The Borolos court found that the other-crimes evidence there
both explained the witnesses' hesitation to come forward, and rebutted "an inference that the
story they told was too improbable to be true." Id. at 478, 143 N.E. at 363. Too, Borolos was a
homosexual sodomy case, and therefore within the depraved sexual instinct exception; see note 3.
supra.
s 229 Ind. at 103, 95 N.E.2d at 579.
"
5The Watts court never specified what "class" it contemplated: was it women, women at
home during the day, white women (Watt's fellow prisoners testified that he "told them . . . that
she was not the only white women he had been with . . ." Id. at 100, 95 N.E.2d at 578), or
someone else? The court, in Loveless v. State, expressly recognized another danger:
We point out that in the Kalas Case the statement that "where there is a common
purpose and design" evidence of other similar crimes is admissible, must be limited to
the particular facts of that case, namely, sexual assaults. To use the term "common
purpose and design" out of the context of that case would enlarge the general rule to
the point where a person could be charged with a specific crime and yet evidence of a
general conspiracy involving numerous other crimes be presented at trial, to his sur-
prise and prejudice.
240 Ind. 534, 541, 166 N.E.2d 864, 867 (1960).
11254 Ind. 127, 258 N.E.2d 411 (1970).
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she knew that he had been wearing a new yellow jacket. A local merchant
testified that Kindred on the same day had bought from him several articles,
among them a new yellow jacket, using the same credit card in that transac-
tion. Pointing out that the merchant's testimony and the sales slip with the
credit card number on it were probative of the identity of the forger, the
court found that the "evidence also tended to show a scheme and plan on the
part of the appellant to use the credit card to obtain merchandise and money
in the local community.1 60 Once again, there was no need for so broad a rul-
ing, since the modus operandi exception was available. Kindred is thus
another step in the expansion of the criteria applied to admit other-crimes
evidence; it is not a long step from "us[ing a] credit card to obtain money
and merchandise" to, for example, "making misrepresentations," or from
there to "perpetrating crimes." There is ultimately no difference between ad-
mitting evidence to show that a defendant had previously perpetrated crimes
upon humanity, on the one hand, and admitting it to show that defendant
was simply a person of bad character, on the other.
Loveless v. State
Among the Indiana cases treating the common scheme or plan exception,
Chief Justice Arterburn's opinion in Loveless v. State6 stands out as a lucid
attempt to deal with many of the difficulties in the case law of the exceptions
to the general exclusionary rule. Loveless had been convicted of the second-
degree robbery of a service station. Admitted into evidence was the testimony
of his former codefendants, who had pleaded guilty: that they had also
burglarized a hardware store, a service station, and a grocery store, all four
burglaries occurring in or near different towns; that Loveless had urged them
to commit the robberies; that he would dispose of the property at his place of
business; and that certain items from some of these burglaries were found at
his truck stop. The court found that the evidence of possession of the fruits of
other burglaries had "no materiality in the case unless evidence of other
crimes in which that property was taken was competent for some proper
reason." 62 As to the other evidence of other crimes, the court responded to
the state's contention that this showed a common scheme or plan to
burglarize various places:
If this be true, it seems to us that "a common scheme or plan" such as
that claimed by the State, would present a crime of conspiracy and such a
crime could have been properly charged[,] . .. the full scheme and plan
could have been developed in the evidence [, and] . . .appellant would have
been properly advised and informed of the nature of the charge against
him.53
'
0Id. at 133, 258 N.E.2d at 415.
61240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864 (1960).
'Id. at 538-39, 166 N.E.2d at 866.
"Id. at 538, 166 N.E.2d at 866.
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The court ruled the evidence inadmissible because "[s]uch evidence is highly
prejudicial. Moreover, a defendant is entitled to be informed specifically of
the crimes charged and not come to trial in the dark and uninformed as to the
nature of the evidence to be presented against him."'6" The court then review-
ed the general grounds for admission of evidence of other crimes, and found
them all inapplicable.6
s
It is difficult to reconcile several recent Indiana decisions with the
Loveless rationale. 66 In Pearson v. State,6 7 the defendant was on trial for the
theft of a suit which she had put in a footlocker and, using an assumed
name, attempted to ship by bus out of the state. The Court of Appeals
dismissed her objection to the admission of testimony that on the day before
the charged act and attempted shipping she and two others had shipped
another footlocker by bus out of the state using an assumed name. The court
held, "Pearson asserts that this testimony was prejudicial and irrelevant but
fails to cite any authority . . . to support the argument. However, the
evidence would have been relevant to show a common scheme or course of
conduct." 68
In Dorsey v. State,6 9 defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary.
The state's witness was allowed to testify to his commission, with Dorsey, of
approximately fifteen burglaries in the month preceding the act charged, and
to the modus operandi used, although the court of appeals did not report the
details. The court tersely held: "Such evidence tended to establish a common
scheme or plan and was therefore within the exception to the rule rendering
"Id. at 539, 166 N.E.2d at 866. These are but two of at least five dangers of admission of
other-crimes evidence. See note 6, supra.
"Id. at 539-40, 166 N.E.2d at 866-67. The court also noted a possible constitutional ques-
tion as to the admissibility of other-crimes evidence. Id. at 541, 166 N.E.2d at 867.
16Adding confusion of issues and undue consumption of time to the two risks mentioned in
Loveless (undue prejudice, unfair surprise) makes the task substantially more difficult yet.
1__ Ind.App. - , 339 N.E.2d 800 (1976).
"Id. at 802. Even assuming arguendo that the earlier shipping showed a "common
scheme," as opposed to a scheme in common, the scheme "proved" could only be one to ship
footlockers out of state by bus under an assumed name, whereas the crime charged was theft.
Moreover, notwithstanding that the evidence does not show a true common scheme or plan, and
notwithstanding that the scheme seen by the court is not one to commit the crime charged, it is
still not clear what inference a fact finder could draw from the evidence, since it is not shown
what the first footlocker held. Because the state presented the evidence at all, a juror would be
forced to infer, it seems, that the first footlocker contained stolen goods or some other item
which it should not; thus, a presumably innocent act may well have contributed to Pearson's con-
viction.
A more recent example of an innocent act being used as evidence to prove a defendant's
guilt can be found in Pierce v. State, - Ind. - , 369 N.E.2d 617 (1977), where the court
also relied on the common scheme or plan exception to admit evidence of a presumably non-
criminal act. In a remarkably circuitous opinion as to this evidence, the court found that defen-
dant's intentions toward and actions with the victim were inferrable from his actions and intent
as to another person, which could be inferred from his actions and intent with the victim. Id. at
621.
6._ Ind.App. - , 357 N.E.2d 280 (1976).
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prior criminal conduct other than that charged inadmissible on the question
of guilt."70
Loveless has not been quietly overruled by the court of appeals alone; the
Indiana Supreme Court has also been chipping away at its interpretation of
the exception. Maldonado v. State" and Biggerstaff v. State72 both arose
from the same fact situation, and each resulted in the defendant's conviction
on two counts of armed robbery. The charged offense was planned by
Maldonado, Biggerstaff, and two others, Corbett and Svara. Maldonado went
to the victims' home in Evansville, Indiana, posing as a salesman. Finding no
one at home, he broke in the front door. When the two residents returned,
Maldonado and Biggerstaff handcuffed them, bound them with duct tape,
and gagged them. Both men were armed. Admitted into evidence was Svara's
testimony that Biggerstaff, Maldonado and he had earlier planned the rob-
bery of a Michigan City, Indiana, home, to be effected by Svara's posing as a
salesman in order to gain entry, then binding the occupants with duct tape,
after which the other two would enter and aid in the robbery. To accomplish
this, Svara testified, he had been given an attache case, duct tape and a
pistol. Finding no one at home, however, Svara left and the plan was aban-
doned. Svara was also allowed to testify, at the Maldonado trial, that before
going to Evansville, he and Maldonado had planned an armed robbery of a
drapery store in which they would pose as customers, handcuff and tape their
victims, and rob them.
The Maldonado court never specifically explained the admissibility of the
testimony relating to the plans to rob the drapery store, so it must be assum-
ed that it felt its reasoning on the evidence of the Michigan City attempt
equally applicable to those plans. As to the Michigan City attempt, the
court vaguely found a "common scheme or plan relevant to appellant's guilt
of the offense charged .... ,,3 The court reasoned that the Michigan City at-
tempt "resembled the one executed in Evansville in numerous details," 74
referring to the method of entry and the use of handcuffs, duct tape, and a
pistol with silencer. 75 The opinion failed to deal with the facts that the
Michigan City attempt was abandoned when the home was found empty,
Svara was to pose as the salesman in the Michigan City robbery, while in
Evansville Maldonado was to be the actor, the duct tape used in Evansville was
only similar to that to be used in Michigan City, and none of the devices used
was particularly unusual for such a crime.
701d. at 284. The court relied upon two cases: Cobbs v. State, - Ind. -' 338 N.E.2d
632 (1975) (rape; other-crimes evidence is admissible if tending to show intent, motive, purpose,
identity, or common scheme or plan; here, relevant to identity); Thompson v. State,
Ind.App. - , 319 N.E.2d 670 (1974) (rape; evidence of defendant's modus operandi admissi-
ble as showing common scheme, design or plan).
"Maldonado v. State, - Ind. - , 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976).
7... Ind. - , 361 N.E.2d 895 (1977).
11355 N.E.2d at 847.




These dissimilarities take on more meaning when viewed in the light of
the reasoning the court used a year later in ruling admissible essentially the
same evidence in Biggerstaff: "As an exception to the general rule [of exclu-
sion], prior crimes that are nearly identical in method are admissible. This
exception requires much more than mere repetition of similar crimes; 'The
device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.'
76
This is, again, the modus operandi exception, not the common scheme or
plan exception. Also, where the court had in Maldonado found a
"resemblance," in Biggerstaff it found facts "so unusual and distinctive as to
be like a signature." The Loveless concern for properly charged crimes7 was
ignored.78
The uncertain, erroneous, and inappropriate application of the common
scheme or plan exception in Indiana has ominous potential for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. A defendant who must counter other-crimes
evidence incorrectly admitted against him must, in effect, overcome a
presumption of guilt created by a showing of the defendant's bad character. 79
76361 N.E.2d at 897. The Biggerstaff court's requirement of much more than similarity is
the same as a requirement of much more than resemblance; yet, in Maldonado, evidence of the
attempt was admitted because it "resembled the one executed . . . in numerous details." 355
N.E.2d at 847.
"See note 58, text at note 61, supra.
78Also, confusion of issues and undue time consumption are evident. This evidence came
from Svara's testimony in Maldonado, 355 N.E.2d at 846, and in Biggerstaff, 361 N.E.2d at 897;
the alternative to admitting his testimony as to the other plans was limiting it to the charged
crime, and this should have been done. The value of the evidence of the plans was directly
related to his credibility as a witness and, if his credibility was expected to be high enough to
persuade the jury of the truth of his testimony, it must also have been expected to be high
enough to make believable his assertions that Maldonado and Biggerstaff were guilty. Since the
evidence of the other criminal activity could have added little, if anything, to testimony limited
strictly to the charged offense, it could scarcely have been of sufficient value to outweigh the risks
of its admission. See note 6, supra.
71See People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 337-38, 61 N.E. 286, 311 (1901) (O'Brien, J..
concurring). This seems to have been the goal of at least one dissenting judge ("I think the
reason of the rule [allowing other-crimes evidence, to show guilty knowledge,] applies with
peculiar force to a case, such as this, of an imposter who goes about the country imposing upon
others by a systematic scheme, of which the particular act is but one of a long series of like cir-
minal acts performed in execution of a formed and continuous design to defraud communities."
Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208, 219 (1882) (Elliott, J., dissenting in an opinion cited as an "able
dissenting opinion" which "correctly expresses the law on this question," Crum v. State, 148 Ind.
401, 412, 47 N.E. 833, 837 (1897)) (no evidence of any such occurrence other than that charged
and that at issue is mentioned in either the majority opinion or the dissent) and one court ("No
more detestable crime could be committed against the good order of society. The acts done by
appellants made up a combination of cheating, lying, stealing, and breach of confidence, ten-
ding to make all honest, simple-minded people suspect every polite stranger they meet with, and
even to distrust their own friends and neighbors. Such a crime against society should be most
severely punished . . . .[Tlhree years' or five years' imprisonment . . . was not an adequate
punishment.... The fact that the credulous, simple-minded prosecuting witness was himself will-
ing to aid in circulating counterfeit money does not lessen the guilt of his tempters, any more
than did the weakness of the denizens of Eden excuse the villainy of the arch fiend who cor-
rupted them." Crum v. State, 148 Ind. 401, 413, 47 N.E.833 837 (1897 (larceny)), although
similar language has not been found in the more recent cases.
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Although the tactic of introducing other-crimes evidence has created constitu-
tional questions for two Chief Justices,8" it does not seem to violate the letter
of the constitution, but only the spirit."'
CONCLUSION
The common scheme or plan and modus operandi exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting the proof of uncharged crimes in a criminal trial to
show the defendant's guilt of the charged crime are useful when correctly ap-
plied, and the benefits of such evidence outweigh the risks of its use. To max-
imize the benefits and minimize the risks, however, these exceptions must be
appreciated by the courts in both their objectives and the respective criteria
for their use. Indiana courts have generally failed in this regard. The courts
have confused these two with each other, as well as with the automatically in-
clusive depraved sexual instinct exception, resulting in a murky hodgepodge
of general admissibility.
The solution to the problem will lie in Indiana courts' recognition of both
the ends to be attained by admission of competent, relevant other-crimes
evidence, and the criteria to be used in deciding the applicability of one or
more of the common-sense exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility. The
depraved sexual instinct test, which results in the automatic admission of
evidence of other incidents of incest or sodomy, where one or both of those
are charged, must be strictly limited to such crimes. The modus operandi ex-
ception must be limited to those trials where the modus operandi is so
"Chief Justice Arterburn warned, in Loveless v. State, 240 Ind. 534, 541, 166 N.E.2d 864,
867 (1960), against enlarging the exception
to the point where a person could be charged with a specific crime and yet evidence of
a general conspiracy involving numerous other crimes be presented at trial, to his sur-
prise and prejudice. It is a constitutional principle that a defendant is entitled to be
informed specifically of the crime charged so that he may prepare an adequate
defense. Constitution of Indiana, Article 1, Section 13.
Chief Justice Buskirk, in Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 128 (1874), said:
It is worthy of notice, that the words "offence" and "accusation" are used [in the
constitution] in the singular....
The evident purpose of such constitutional provision was to guard and protect the
rights of a person accused of crime, and to prevent him from being prejudiced in the
defence of one crime by evidence tending to prove that he had been guilty of another
and distinct crime.
"1A challenge based on the language of the constitution faces several obstacles. A defendant
is, strictly speaking, informed of the charged crime by a properly drafted indictment or informa-
tion, although he is not thereby informed of the other crimes of which he will be accused in
court. A narrow reading of "offense" and "accusation," as proposed by Chief Justice Buskirk,
supra note 80, proves too much, since it illegitimizes joinder and thus runs afoul of the policy of
prosecutorial discretion. A nontechnical interpretation of "charge" and "accusation" to mean
charging or accusing in court also proves too much, since it would eliminate all of the other-
crimes exceptions where defendant has not been apprised of the state's intention to use such
evidence and has not had adequate time to prepare to meet it.
The only constitutional complication, then, arises from the underlying philosophy of
fairness to the defendant, who must defend, at potentially great expense, against allegations of
crime which he did not expect and which are sure to influence the minds of the jurors.
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unusual as to preclude a reasonable possibility that the crimes were commit-
ted by different persons, and courts should consider the temporal and
geographical closeness of the charged and uncharged crimes. The common
scheme or plan exception must be revamped to contemplate an initial plan
which included the commission of the charged and uncharged crimes, thus
showing the motive for the former, while eliminating the need for any
similarity or proximity in the crimes. The common scheme or plan, to be
probative, must require the commission of the charged crime for its effectua-
tion and should be proved to a greater degree of definition of its scope than a
scant plan to commit a series of crimes upon a class of persons, which is
nothing more than proof of bad character.
THOMAS QUIGLEY
